Satellite systems are increasingly becoming targets of sophisticated cyberattacks, with nation-states and cybercriminal groups exploiting vulnerabilities in ground stations, communication links, and supply chains. According to the CSIS 2025 Space Threat Assessment, cyber incidents targeting space assets surged by 192% between 2019 and 2025, with five major attacks reported in 2024 alone1. This article examines the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) used in these attacks, along with defensive measures for securing critical infrastructure.
Key Attack Vectors in Satellite Systems
Cyberattacks on satellites often exploit weaknesses in ground stations, communication protocols, or onboard systems. The 2022 Viasat attack demonstrated how unpatched VPNs could lead to widespread disruption. Attackers used the “AcidRain” malware to wipe over 11,000 modems, mapping to MITRE ATT&CK techniques T1190 (Exploit Public-Facing Application) and T1498 (Network Denial of Service)2. Other common vectors include:
- Jamming/Spoofing: Russia’s GPS spoofing in Ukraine disrupted navigation systems, while China has deployed co-orbital jammers against Indian satellites3.
- Sensor Hijacking: Historical incidents include Hamas hijacking Israeli TV feeds (2014, 2016) and China’s laser blinding of U.S. sensors (2006).
- Supply Chain Compromise: A 42% increase in credential theft linked to Redline malware highlights risks in commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) components4.
Defensive Innovations and Mitigation Strategies
The Aerospace Corporation’s SpaceCOP prototype provides onboard intrusion detection for CubeSats, while MITRE’s extended ATT&CK for Space framework now includes 20 techniques across seven tactics5. Key recommendations include:
“AI/ML reduces threat detection time by 50% when integrated with satellite payloads, according to Deloitte’s 2024 space cybersecurity report.”6
Table 1 summarizes notable cyber incidents affecting space systems:
| Year | Incident | Group | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | Viasat Attack | APT29 (Cozy Bear) | 11,000+ modems disabled |
| 2024 | Microsoft Email Breach | Russian state actors | Regulatory investigations |
Policy Gaps and Future Directions
No universal cybersecurity standards exist for satellite systems, though U.S. Space Policy Directive-5 mandates Secure-by-Design principles7. The Space ISAC’s threat-sharing platform has documented over 100 weekly cyberattack attempts on member organizations8.
For security teams, immediate actions include:
- Patch management for ground station VPNs and network appliances
- Implementation of AI-driven telemetry analysis (e.g., DARS for NOAA satellites)
- Adoption of MITRE ATT&CK for Space detection rules
As space systems become more interconnected, the need for robust cybersecurity frameworks grows increasingly urgent. The combination of advanced persistent threats and kinetic anti-satellite weapons creates a complex threat environment requiring coordinated defense strategies.
References
- “CSIS 2025 Space Threat Assessment,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2025. [Online]. Available: https://gbhackers.com/satellite-cyber-threats
- “MITRE ATT&CK for Space,” MITRE Corporation, 2025. [Online]. Available: https://attack.mitre.org/groups
- “China’s Non-Kinetic Space Threats,” Swarajya, 2025. [Online]. Available: https://swarajyamag.com/defence/chinas-space-threats
- “Supply Chain Risks in Space Systems,” Fortinet, 2025. [Online]. Available: https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/space-supply-chain-threats
- “SpaceCOP Intrusion Detection System,” Aerospace Corporation, 2024. [Online]. Available: https://aerospace.org/spacecop
- “AI in Space Cybersecurity,” Deloitte, 2024. [Online]. Available: https://www2.deloitte.com/cyber-threats-space
- “U.S. Space Policy Directive-5,” White House, 2020. [Online]. Available: https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/space-policy-directive-5
- “Space ISAC Threat Report,” Space ISAC, 2024. [Online]. Available: https://space-isac.org/threat-reports
