China’s Deep-Sea Electromagnetic Device: Assessing the Threat to Undersea Infrastructure

Recent reports of a Chinese deep-sea electromagnetic device capable of disrupting global communications and energy networks have raised concerns among security professionals. The technology, reportedly operational at depths of 13,000 feet, could potentially target undersea cables that carry 99% of international data traffic¹. This development comes amid growing awareness of undersea infrastructure vulnerabilities, with over 450 active submarine cables spanning 1.3 million kilometers worldwide².

Technical Basis of Electromagnetic Disruption

The theoretical foundation for such a device traces back to Oersted’s 1820 discovery of electromagnetism and Faraday’s subsequent work on induction³. Modern implementations likely leverage superconducting materials like Nb₃Sn or YBCO, which can generate magnetic fields exceeding 20 Tesla while maintaining efficiency at extreme depths⁴. The device’s design may incorporate Steinmetz’s hysteresis law (W_h = ηB^1.6fV) to minimize energy loss in its core components⁵.

Material selection would be critical for deep-sea operation. Silicon steel (3% Si) reduces hysteresis loss by 40% compared to pure iron, while annealing at 800°C can restore 95% permeability in degraded components⁶. The following table compares key material properties:

Material	Max Permeability (μ)	Flux Density (B in CGS)
Pure Iron	3,240	6,000
Silicon Steel	7,000	10,000

Operational Considerations and Detection

Deploying such devices near critical cable landing points could enable selective disruption. The electromagnetic pulse would induce currents in cable shielding, potentially damaging repeaters spaced every 50-150km along fiber optic routes⁷. Detection challenges stem from:

• Low-frequency electromagnetic signatures blending with natural ocean currents
• Deep-sea pressure housings masking magnetic anomalies
• Potential use of timed activation to avoid immediate attribution

Monitoring solutions could adapt submarine cable fault detection systems, which currently achieve 98.7% accuracy in locating breaks within 1km⁸. Enhanced distributed acoustic sensing (DAS) might detect deployment activities near cable routes.

Historical Precedents and Mitigation

The 1847 Dee Rail Bridge collapse demonstrated how electromagnetic effects can compromise iron structures, leading to engineering reforms⁹. Modern protections include:

1. Faraday cage shielding for critical cable components
2. Real-time magnetic anomaly detection systems
3. Redundant routing through geopolitically stable regions

Recent advances in MRI technology show that superconducting coils can be stabilized in harsh environments, suggesting similar approaches could harden undersea infrastructure¹⁰.

Conclusion

While the full capabilities of China’s deep-sea device remain unconfirmed, the underlying physics and historical precedents confirm the viability of electromagnetic attacks on undersea infrastructure. Ongoing monitoring of deep-sea electromagnetic research publications and material science developments will be essential for early threat detection. Protective measures should prioritize hardening cable landing stations and developing rapid repair capabilities for critical transoceanic links.