Poland Cyberattack: Technical Analysis of Russian-Linked Election Disruption Campaign

Poland’s political infrastructure faced a significant cyberattack targeting the ruling Civic Platform (PO) party ahead of the May 18 presidential election. Prime Minister Donald Tusk attributed the attack to “origins in the east,” implicating Russian or Belarusian state-linked actors¹. The 12-hour campaign aimed at hijacking computers of party staff and election teams, leveraging malware signatures tied to known Russian operations². This incident underscores the escalating hybrid warfare tactics against NATO frontline states.

Attack Methodology and Attribution

The attackers employed a combination of DDoS and phishing campaigns, with IPs traced to Moscow and Minsk³. Polish CERT identified tools linked to the Sofacy Group (APT29), previously active in Ukraine⁴. Compromised emails revealed attempts to spread disinformation about PO’s EU ties, mirroring tactics used in the 2016 U.S. election interference⁵. Key technical indicators include:
– **Malware**: Custom variants of **Sofacy’s X-Agent** with C2 servers hosted on compromised VPS providers.
– **Phishing Lures**: Fake election monitoring portals mimicking Polish government domains (e.g., `gov-pl[.]election[.]online`).

Election Context and Geopolitical Implications

The attack coincides with polls showing PO’s Rafał Trzaskowski leading at 35%, with conservative and far-right candidates trailing¹. Poland’s role as a vocal critic of Russian aggression in Ukraine makes it a high-priority target for disruption. Historical precedents include Belarus-linked **Ghostwriter** campaigns, which collaborated with Russian GRU³. NATO has pledged cybersecurity support, including threat intelligence sharing⁶.

Relevance to Security Professionals

For defensive teams, the attack highlights the need for:
– **Enhanced Monitoring**: Polish CERT’s rapid response relied on anomaly detection in DNS queries to malicious domains.
– **Patch Management**: APT29 exploited unpatched Exchange servers in prior campaigns⁴.
– **Threat Hunting**: IOC feeds from APT29’s X-Agent variants are critical for proactive defense.

Offensive researchers should note the attackers’ use of:
– **Malleable C2 Profiles**: Customized Cobalt Strike beacons with DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) for evasion.
– **Process Injection**: Leveraged **Process Hollowing** to evade EDR solutions.

“Poland’s CERT thwarted the attack by sinkholing C2 domains within 4 hours of detection.” — Security Affairs³

Remediation and Future Preparedness

Organizations in high-risk sectors should:
1. Deploy **YARA rules** for Sofacy Group malware detection.
2. Audit email gateways for suspicious attachments mimicking election-related documents.
3. Enforce **MFA** for all political campaign staff.

The attack’s technical footprint suggests a testing phase for broader operations against EU elections later in 2025. Continuous collaboration between national CERTs and private-sector threat intelligence teams will be critical.

References

1. “Poland’s ruling party hit by cyberattack ahead of election,” AP News, Apr. 2, 2025.
2. “Polish PM Tusk cites ‘foreign interference’ in cyberattack,” Reuters, Apr. 2, 2025.
3. “Poland thwarts cyberattacks traced to Russia and Belarus,” Security Affairs, Apr. 4, 2025.
4. “Belarusian hacker groups collaborated with GRU in Poland attack,” Polish State Radio, Apr. 4, 2025.
5. “Tusk’s ‘origins in the east’ remark points to Russia,” Nestia, Apr. 4, 2025.
6. “NATO pledges cybersecurity support to Poland,” Euronews, Apr. 2, 2025.